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ADMINISTRATIVE FACT FINDINGS
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT
PART TWO*
SIGMUND TIMBERGt
IV. SUPPORTING FINDINGS: "ESSENTIAL," "BASIC," AND
"QUASI-JURISDICTIONAL" FACTS
In the very short space of time, 1931 to 1935, the Supreme
Court, in cases dealing with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, evolved a doctrine to the effect that "essential," "basic,"
or "quasi-jurisdictional" facts must be expressed in findings of
appropriate definiteness, such findings, of course, to be buttressed
by evidence in support thereof. These decisions repay scrutiny
in their own right and as precedents for some more recent cases
that will be discussed in the next section.6 5 Despite the linguistic
distinction which these cases draw between the evidence and the
findings, one has doubts-it is difficult to determine whether the
Court is more nettled by the absence of specific findings or by the
absence of supporting evidence.
In Florida v. United States,6 6 the Court, through Chief Justice
Hughes, overturned an Interstate Commerce Commission order
requiring a railroad carrier to increase its intrastate rates for
transporting logs throughout the State of Florida, so as to make
the intrastate rates correspond with the interstate rates pre-
scribed by the Commission. Both the district court and the
Supreme Court agreed that the order could not be sustained as
justified by section 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, per-
mitting the increase upon a proper administrative determination
of undue prejudice "as between persons or localities in intra-
state commerce on the one hand and interstate * * * commerce
on the other hand." The Commission had, in passing on the
"interstate commerce" involved, considered only transportation
from points in the northern part of Florida to points in Georgia;
* The first part of this article appeared at 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW
QUARTERLY 62.
t Member, British Empire Division, Board of Economic Warfare; for-
merly Senior Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.
65. See p. 17G et seq., infra. For the same doctrine, in a case directly
influenced by the Supreme Court precedents, see Valley and Siletz R. R. v.
Thomas (1935) 151 Ore. 80, 48 P. (2d) 358.
66. (1931) 282 U. S. 194.
1942]
Washington University Open Scholarship
170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
this was a purely potential commerce, since no actual movement
from Florida to Georgia had been shown. To justify the "as-
sumption" that the protection of this interstate commerce from
unjust discrimination required the alteration of the existing
intrastate rates for the transportation of logs within Florida
"would not only require evidence to support it but findings of
appropriate definiteness to express it,"'67 and neither evidence nor
findings was present.
Accepting defeat on this issue, the Government and Commis-
sion then addressed themselves in their argument before the
Supreme Court to an entirely different ground, i. e., that the
raising of the intrastate rates was necessary because the existing
rates caused "undue discrimination against the carrier's general
interstate commerce." This argument, likewise based on section
13 (4), was also rejected by the Supreme Court. Section 13 (4),
by being "dovetailed" with section 15 (a) of the act, was inter-
preted to mean that intrastate traffic should pay its fair pro-
portionate share of the railroad's cost of maintenance, so that
the insufficiency of the intrastate rates would not cast an undue
revenue burden upon the interstate carrier. "It must appear
that there are findings, supported by evidence, of the essential
facts as to the particular traffic and revenue, and the effect of
the intrastate rates, both as existing and as prescribed, upon the
income of the carrier * * *,,68 The mere general averment, in
the language of the statute, that intrastate rates result "in un-
just discrimination against interstate commerce" was insuffi-
cient "in the absence of supporting findings of fact as to the
revenue from the traffic in question."'' 9 Nor was this basic lack
supplied by the Commission's determination that the intrastate
rates were not remunerative or compensatory; for the raising
of rates might, by discouraging patronage, reduce total revenue.
The Court made it clear that it was doing more than criticizing
the Commission for not making a suitably complete statement
of the grounds upon which it based its conclusion, as it had done
in Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Railway v. United States,0
decided about six weeks previously. The decision was based on7
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id. at 212
69. Id. at 213.
70. (1930) 282 U. S. 74.
71. Florida v. U. S. (1931) 282 U. S. 194, 215.
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the lack of the basic or essential findings required to support
the Commission's order. In the absence of such findings, we
are not called upon to examine the evidence in order to re-
solve opposing contentions as to what it shows or to spell
out and state such conclusions of fact as it may permit. The
Commission is the fact-finding body and the Court examines
the evidence not to make findings for the Commission but to
ascertain whether its findings are properly supported.
The case therefore stands for the proposition that a finding is
not sufficient which merely repeats in haec verba the language
of the statute, but that the Commission must make additional
findings that will corroborate the specific determination re-
quired by the statute. In appraising this case, it may be well to
ponder whether the Court's attitude was tinctured by the fact
that intrastate rates, customarily subject to the jurisdiction of
a state regulatory commission, had been brought within the
ambit of federal regulation on the basis of the alleged discrimi-
nation; the possibility of constitutional invalidity may account
for the Chief Justice's hesitancy.
In United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,'2 the statute
authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe
changes in the equipment used by railroads where such changes
were required to remove "unnecessary peril to life or limb."
Relying on the Florida case, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Brandeis, asserted that the Commission's "finding to that effect
is essential to the existence of authority to promulgate the rule." 3
Consequently, when the Commission, in ordering carriers to be
equipped with a suitable type of power-operated reverse-gear,
found only that "the safety of employees and travellers on rail-
roads" required the change to a limited extent, and left the
statutory finding as a mere inference therefrom, the Court de-
clared the Commission's order void. Here again, the Court em-
phasized that while a complete statement of the grounds of the
Commission's determination was desirable as a labor-saving de-
vice for a reviewing court, incompleteness was not fatal to the
validity of the order and formal and precise findings were not
required. However, there did exist a necessity for making,
"where orders are subject to judicial review, quasi-jurisdictional
72. (1935) 293 U. S. 454.
73. Id. at 463.
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findings essential to their constitutional or statutory validity."'1
This case seems to add to the doctrine set forth in the Florida
case, for it makes it clear that orders which are subject to ju-
dicial review must contain quasi-jurisdictional findings essential
to constitutional, as well as statutory, validity. Our problem now
becomes: What is the nature of these quasi-jurisdictional find-
ings?
In United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
Railroad Co.,75 the Interstate Commerce Commission rejected a
proposed rate schedule. Acting pursuant to section 15 (1) and
(7) of its act, it determined that the proposed rate schedule
would be unreasonable and would violate the section of the acti
requiring it to give due consideration to the need of adequate
and efficient railway transportation and to the need of revenue
sufficient to enable the carrier to provide service at the lowest
cost consistent with the furnishing of such service. The Com-
mission's finding that the proposed rates would be unreasonable
could not stand unless supported by facts more particularly
stated. Those facts were not found, for there was no suggestion
that the rates were less than compensatory or that they would
result in impaired service to the public, and the finding of un-
reasonableness was entirely predicated, according to the Court,
on the assumption-which the Court thought illusory-that the
proposed rates would disrupt the rate structure hitherto pre-
vailing. The least that might be expected from the Commission
would be findings that would indicate the expected loss of
revenue to the carriers and whether that loss would be trivial or
substantial.
Mr. Justice Cardozo concludes the Court's opinion with a
paragraph that may be taken as indicative of the extent to which
the Court wishes to be confronted with explicit quasi-jurisdic-
tional findings :7
We would not be understood as saying that there do not
lurk in this report phrases or sentences suggestive of a dif-
ferent meaning. One gains at places the impression that the
Commission looked upon the proposed reduction as some-
thing more than a disruptive tendency; that it found unfair-
74. Id. at 465.
75. (1935) 294 U. S. 499.
76. Id. at 510-511.
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ness in the old relation of parity between Brazil and Spring-
field; and that the new schedule in its judgment would con-
firm Milwaukee in the enjoyment of an undue proportion
of the traffic. The difficulty is that it has not said so with
the simplicity and clearness through which a halting impres-
sion ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we are left
to spell out, to argue, to choose between conflicting infer-
ences. Something more precise is requisite in the quasi-jurisdictional findings of an administrative agency.
The facts in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway v. United
States"7 in which the opinion was written by Mr. Justice Butler,
need not be extensively recapitulated. Suffice it to say that a
shipper of cattle had attacked as unreasonable, in violation of
section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, (a) tariff charges by
the carrier applicable to the switching of live stock to its pack-
ing plant and (b) yardage charges collected by the stock yard
company on livestock delivered at the stock yards. The Com-
mission had decided that the switching charge imposed by the
carrier was not unreasonable or unlawful, but that the live stock
was not subject to yardage charges where delivery of the live
stock was taken by the shipper at the unloading pens. The Court
felt that, since the rate schedules adopted by the carriers were
supposed to include everything that was incidental to transpor-
tation, it was important to determine whether transportation
covered unloading and the use of property immediately subse-
quent to unloading; to the extent that transportation did embrace
such other activities, the activities could not be subjected to
charges over and above the rates fixed in the official tariffs.
Furthermore, where transportation ended the Interstate Com-
merce Commission's jurisdiction ended and the Secretary of
Agriculture's jurisdiction began. Despite the importance of this
issue, "the Commission, in respect of the shipments covered by
its order, made no definite finding as to what constitutes complete
delivery or where transportation ends. Its report does not dis-
close the basic facts on which it made the challenged order. This
Court will not search the record to ascertain whether, by use of
what there may be found, general and ambiguous statements in
the report intended to serve as findings may by construction be
given a meaning sufficiently definite and certain to constitute a
77. (1935) 295 U. S. 193.
19421
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valid basis for the order. In the absence of a finding of essential
basic facts, the order cannot be sustained." 718 Mr. Justice Stone,
in a dissent concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, took
issue as to the materiality of "the precise point in space at which
delivery is complete, or where transportation ends."79 He felt
that the basic policy of the Transportation Act made it clear
that all of the services in connection with transportation were to
be performed for a single scheduled rate, and that the Commis-
sion was therefore correct in forbidding the yardage charge as
applied to live stock taken by the consignee direct from the un-
loading pens.
The doctrine somewhat confusedly limned in the foregoing
four cases not only elevates into a canon of validity of adminis-
trative action what the Court had prior thereto merely eulogized
as desirable, but also tends dangerously in the direction of nulli-
fying the presumption of the correctness of administrative fact
finding.80 What does the doctrine amount to? What are the
"basic," "essential," and "quasi-jurisdictional" facts concerning
which findings must be made?
Analysis of the cases that have just been described points to
the exclusion from this category of facts relating to jurisdiction
over the person81 and place,82 and the inclusion of facts relevant
78. Id. at 202-203.
79. Id. at 203. This factual determination (quasi-jurisdictional or not)
is still important, but one that it is now recognized must be made in the
first instance by an administrative body rather than by the courts. See
Armour and Co. v. Alton R. R. (1941) 312 U. S. 195.
80. See Darnell v. Edwards (1917) 244 U. S. 564, 569 (rate fixing); St.
Joseph Stock Yards v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 53 (rate fixing); N. L. R.
B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp. (1940) 309 U. S. 206, 208, 226.
81. This class of facts is what the courts usually have in mind when they
refer to "jurisdictional facts." The use of words like "quasi-jurisdictional"
and "essential" is probably a purposive oike intended to make clear their
differentiation from "jurisdictional facts." Thus, for example, in Crowell v.
Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22, M. Justice Brandeis in his dissent contends
that the employer-employee relationship is only a "quasi-jurisdictional fact,"
whereas Chief Justice Hughes for the majority regards it as a "jurisdic-
tional fact." Also, compare Ng Fung Ho v. White (1922) 259 U. S. 276
(alienage held to be a "jurisdictional fact" in deportation proceeding), with
United States v. Tod (1924) 264 U. S. 131 (alien's knowledge of seditious
character of printed matter held to be "essential" fact to deportation).
82. The Atchison case, in holding the existence of transportation to be a
quasi-jurisdictional fact, is reminiscent of the Crowell v. Benson case's
treatment of the locale of injury as a jurisdictional fact. It is significant
that in the Atchison case three Justices dissented on the ground that trans-
portation was an economic process and not a change in geographical situs.
In view of the recurring possibility of attacks on administrative agencies
for transgressing the bounds of the federal interstate commerce power, it
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/3
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to jurisdiction over the subject matter. 3 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter, however, is a notorious verbal wanton, at times
obscurely and tenuously distinguishable from the "merits" of a
controversy.8' The Florida case, on the one hand, seems to say
that the "basic" or "essential" facts are those defining the evil
upon the ascertainment of which the remedial administrative
process goes into operation ;85 this is a dubious type of limitation,
for it is evident that an evil is to a large measure co-extensive,
so far as the relevant evidentiary facts are concerned, with the
basis for its amelioration. The Baltimore and Ohio case, on the
other hand, identifies these crucial facts as the statutory condi-
tions which the issuance of an administrative order must satisfy.
The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul case uses the criteria em-
ployed in both the Florida and the Baltimore and Ohio cases; it
includes both the facts that are necessary preliminaries to the
inception of administrative action, and the facts necessary to its
successful culmination in an administrative order or decree. If
this test be accurate, very little that is material to the decision
of a case falls outside the scope of "basic," "essential," and
"quasi-jurisdictional" facts.
In effect, then, the problem of defining these facts becomes
closely assimilated to the perennial problem of defining a court's
has become customary for the agencies to make jurisdictional findings con-
cerning interstate commerce. This practice has been held to be unnecessary
when the jurisdictional facts appear elsewhere in the course of the adminis-
trative proceeding. See Detroit Edison Co. v. S. E. C. (C. C. A. 6, 1941)
119 F. (2d) 730, 740.
83. For the three major types of jurisdiction, see Terry v. Huntington
(1669) Hardres 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557; Black, The "Jurisdictional Fact"
Theory and Administrative Finality (1937) 22 Cornell L. Q. 349, 355.
84. "Many of the erroneous determinations of jurisdiction arise from mis-
construction of a statute or from mistakes of law; and it is doubtful whether
a hard and fast line can be drawn between mistakes of law and mistakes
of jurisdiction." Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action
by the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 133. See
Brandeis, J., dissenting in Crowell v. Benson on the ground that the
employer-employee relationship was only a "quasi-jurisdictional" fact going
to the applicability of the substantive law, and not to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
85. Accord: I. C. C. v. Northern Pacific Ry. (1910) 216 U. S. 538 (non-
existence of reasonable or satisfactory routes a jurisdictional fact for order
establishing through routes); I. C. C. v. Louisville and Nashville R. R.(1913) 227 U. S. 88 (unreasonable rates); Hale, Commissions, Rates, and
Policies (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1104; cf. I. C. C. v. Stickney (1909)
215 U. S. 98, 105 (unreasonable charges); Southern Pacific v. I. C. C.
(1911) 219 U. S. 433 (unreasonable rates); Wyman, Jurisdictional Limita-
tions upon Commission Action (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 561 et seq.
1942]
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jurisdiction over the subject matter, i. e., the general abstract
question of whether the case belongs to the general class of cases
over which the tribunal has power to act.8 6 Ordinarily, in the
case of statutes conferring administrative authority, that ques-
tion can be resolved by direct reference to the language of the
statute itself. And were this all that was involved, the doctrine
so laboriously spun out by the Supreme Court in this connection
would be equivalent to the simple rule, discussed in the first two
sections of this article, calling for administrative agencies to
repeat the ultimate findings which the statute requires them to
make. The FloriKa, and Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul cases,
however, go further, for they require that the ultimate statutory
findings be supported by more particular findings. While such a
requirement is in effect a recognition of the inanity of the en-
forced repetition of mere statutory language, does it contribute
anything that would not have been furnished by a judicial decla-
ration that the evidence did not support the ultimate findings?
Or is it in effect a polite way of saying that the court is not dis-
posed, where an administrative agency has compiled a slipshod
and badly integrated evidentiary record, to inquire whether the
evidence does in fact support these ultimate findings? The an-
swer to these questions may perhaps become clearer after we
have discussed one other effort on the part of the courts to
require the making of subsidiary, as contrasted with ultimate,
findings of fact.
V. SUPPORTING FINDINGS: THE STEPHENS APPROACH
Probably the best expressed recent effort to convert the estab-
lished dichotomy between evidence and findings into a tripartite
hierarchy that will embrace supporting as well as ultimate find-
ings may be found in Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Corn-
inunications Commission.8  Judge Stephens there distinguishes
between (1) evidence, (2) facts of a basic or underlying nature,
86. See Comment (1928) 2 Dakota I. Rev. 152.
87. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 554, cert. den. (1938) 305 U. S. 613.
The Federal Communications Act, as has been noted, explicitly requires
findings.
A similar analysis underlies Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Ry. (1915) 236
U. S. 412; Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Ill. Commerce Comm. (1933) 353
Ill. 375, 187 N. E. 449 ("principal issues"). Cf. also Judge Stephens' dis-
senting opinion in Goodacre v. Panagopoulos (App. D. C. 1940) 110 F.
(2d) 716 (involving judicial findings).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/3
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and (3) ultimate facts (the determinations required by the
statute, which can usually be couched in statutory language).
In the Saginaw case, for example, the ultimate fact to be found
was that the public interest, convenience or necessity would be
served by the Commission's granting the radio station construc-
tion permit which had been applied for. This ultimate fact would
have to be "inferred" from certain basic facts, such as the prob-
able existence or non-existence of electrical interference, the
number of other stations operating in the area, their power,
wave length, etc. "Inferred" was defined to mean "that there
shall be some rational or coherent relationship between the basic
facts and the ultimate facts, that the latter shall flow logically
from the former."'8 The basic findings need not, of course, be
set out in formal style or in the technical manner customary in
trial courts.
On the basis of this prepossessing logical structure, however,
the case develops some dangerous implications. With respect to
hours of operation, for example, the Commission had made (1)
an admittedly erroneous statement, and (2) a bare finding that
the needs of the area about Saginaw required the type of unin-
terrupted broadcast until sunset which was proposed in the ap-
lication for the permit. The court held, with respect to the
erroneous statement, that it would reverse any order of the
Commission based on findings contrary to the evidence, even if
the evidence justified other findings upon the basis of which the
order could be upheld.89 The finding with respect to the needs of
the area about Saginaw was a "bare inference," and the court
could not be asked to determine whether the evidence supported
facts corroborating that inference. Likewise stigmatized as an
inference rather than a finding of fact was the Commission's
"finding" that the grantees of the permit were financially quali-
fied.90
88. See Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F.
(2d) 564, 567, with opinion delivered by Judge Stephens the same day.
89. "The question is not whether a correct finding could have been made
the basis for the same decision by the Commission, but whether the finding
on which the decision was actually based was a correct one." Tri-State
Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 554, 562.
90. "The Commission's finding * * * does not disclose any facts bearing
on either of the above aspects of the question of financial qualifications.
* * * Even though there may be evidence in the record-upon this we do
not pass-from which the Commission might have concluded that the inter-
19421
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It is doubtful whether the doctrinal approach of the Saginaw
case still stands. The Supreme Court, in a later case likewise
involving an application for a radio construction permit, seems
to have repudiated the conceptualism inherent in the Saginaw
case, 9" harking back to the temperate note of casual criticism
that characterized some of its earlier decisions. 2 Also, the notion
that a single invalid finding necessarily vitiates an entire admin-
istrative order, even if the ultimate conclusions of fact are sup-
ported on a total view of the evidence, is against the weight of
venors would receive adequate commercial support in the sense above
stated, this does not excuse the Commission from its duty of making a
finding as the result of its consideration of that evidence." Tri-State Broad-
casting Co. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 Fed. 554, 563.
91. See F. C. C. v. Sanders Bros. (1940) 309 U. S. 470. Associate Justice
Miller, in the court below, had said that the Commission's decision as to the
public interest, convenience and necessity could not stand unless based upon
supporting findings. "Moreover, it is not the function of this Court to
review the evidence for the purpose of making findings or of justifying
findings not made-it is not sufficient that they be marshalled and presented
in the brief on appeal. They must be prepared as findings of fact, upon
which the decision of the Commission may be rested." Sanders Bros. V.
F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 321, 324-326.
In addition, the court held that, since the issue of economic injury to a
competing broadcasting station had been clearly presented to the Commis-
sion, the Commission had erred in not making a clear finding on this point.
While the evidence supported a possible inference that the competing station
would not be injured, that inference, "viewed in the light of the finding that
appellant is losing money, is not a necessary one. Another possible inference
is that the Commission totally disregarded the issue of economic injury to
appellant; and another, that the Commission considered the issue and found
it to be without merit. What actually occurred we are left to surmise. To
avoid such a situation is the purpose of the rule" requiring findings of fact.
Id. at 325. The Supreme Court said that no finding concerning economic
injury to rival stations was necessary, since the Congressional purpose was
only to protect the general public, and not to protect existing licensees
against competition.
92. In dismissing the attack on the sufficiency of the findings generally,
Mr. Justice Roberts merely said, "If the findings were not as detailed upon
this subject as might, be desirable, the attack upon them is not that the
public interest is not sufficiently protected but only that the financial inter-
ests of the respondent have not been considered." (italics supplied)
See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station
(1940) 309 U. S. 470, 477. Cf. Beaumont, Sour Lake, and Western Ry.
(1930) 282 U. S. 74, upholding an I. C. C. division of joint rates, even
though "the Commission's failure specifically to report the facts and give
the reasons on which it concluded that under the circumstances the use of
the average or group basis is justified leaves the parties in doubt as to a
matter essential to the case and imposes unnecessary work upon the courts
called upon to consider the validity of the order. Complete statements by
the Commission showing the grounds upon which its determinations rest
are quite as necessary as are opinions of lower courts setting forth the
reasons on which they base their decisions in cases analogous to this";
United States v. Louisiana (1933) 290 U. S. 70, 188.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/3
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authority,93 although there may be situations where a single
finding embraces such a large portion of the relevant evidence
that its overthrow would indicate that there is lacking eviden-
tiary support for issuance of the order. And, if the courts
acquiesce in the proposition that an administrative body may,
where the parties before it expressly waive their right to findings
of fact, issue an order based upon the entire record without any
administrative findings, 94 the importance of specific findings by
administrative tribunals becomes still further minimized.
Furthermore, the attempted distinction between findings of
fact and inferences is a false dichotomy, since findings of fact
are necessarily inferences from the evidence. 95 Judge Stephens
is simply endorsing as "findings" those inferences from the evi-
dence which he believes valid, and is castigating as "inferences"
the inferences which he believes unwarranted. Another premise,
inarticulate but implicit in his position, is that the special ad-
vantage that experience gives an administrative agency in the
sphere of what he calls "fact-finding" disappears in the field of
"inference," and that courts have a special competence in the
latter field. This premise likewise is disputable; if experience
enables an administrative agency to draw inferences from a
background of more or less abundant evidence (to use Judge
Stephens' language, to "find facts") more accurately than an
inexperienced court, it should confer a similar superiority where
evidence is scant (the so-called field of "inference").- In short,
the court's comments concerning "possible" and "necessary" in-
93. Sometimes a single valid finding will be sufficient to sustain an order,
even if the others are invalid, N. L. R. B. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (C. C.
A. 2, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 376, 379. See also N. L. R. B. v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (1939) 308 U. S. 241, 247; Kansas City P. & L.
Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 340, 357; Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 930; N. L. R.
B. v. Nat'l Casket Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 107 IF. (2d) 992, 998; Bd. of
Trade of K. C. v. U. S. (D. C. W. D. Mo. W. D. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 865.
Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Swift & Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 143, 145;
Conn v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390; N. L. R. B. v.
Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 350,
cert. granted (1941) 62 S. Ct. 77.
94. See N. L. R. B. v. Central Mo. Tel. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 115 F. (2d)
563, 567; N. L. R. B. v. Pure Oil Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 497.
95. Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S. (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 538 (find-
ing called "a statement of an opinion").
96. It is true, of course, that inferences drawn on the basis of meager
evidence are usually less reliable than those based on a substantial accumu-
lation of evidence, regardless of who draws the inference.
1942]
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ferences are apt camouflage whereby the court's conception of
rationality and coherence can be made to control over that of the
administrative tribunal, and cannot be reconciled with the sound
dictum of the Supreme Court that "Congress entrusted the
Board, not the Courts, with the power to draw inferences from
the facts.
9 7
The whole theory of reversal, rather than reprimand, for in-
valid findings is inconsistent with the judicial rule permitting a
court to make additional findings, if the evidence conclusively
points to such findings and if "it clearly appears that, in the
interest of justice, the controversy should be decided without
further delay."9 8 In this connection, one should not be oblivious
of the danger that the court may not make the same findings as
the administrative body would have made, and that therefore
this rule, if carried too far, will invade the proper scope of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine and substitute the judiciary as
the fact-finding agency in place of the administrative.19 How-
ever, if the rule is limited to situations where the court affirms
the action of the administrative body, it operates as an instru-
ment of justice, for it seems fundamentally unjust to keep a
twice-vindicated litigant in suspense merely in order that the ad-
ministrative body may supply him with corrected reasons for his
vindication.
97. See N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt (1941) 311 U. S. 584, 597; N. L. R. B.
v. Penn. Greyhound Lines (1938) 303 U. S. 261, 271; N. L. R. B. v. Falk
Corp. (1940) 308 U. S. 453; N. L. R. B. v. Swift & Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940)
116 F. (2d) 143, 145.
98. F. T. C. v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1923) 260 U. S. 568, 580. Accord:
International Shoe Co. v. F. T. C. (1930) 280 U. S. 291, 297; N. L. R. B. v.
Nat'l Motor Bearing Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 652, 657; Detroit
Edison Co. v. S. E. C. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 730. Cf. Ford Motor
Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1939) 305 U. S. 364, 373 (court, in reviewing N. L. R. B.
orders, may adjust its relief "to secure a just result with a minimum of
technical requirements"). Contra: Kidder Oil Co. v. F. T. C. (C. C. A. 7,
1941) 117 F. (2d) 892.
99. Thus, in the Curtis case, Chief Justice Taft doubted the wisdom of
the sentence in the majority opinion quoted in the text, on the ground that
"it may bear the construction that the Court has discretion to sum up the
evidence pro and con on issues undecided by the Commission and make
itself the fact-finding body, ** *." F. T. C. v. Curtis Publihsing Co. (1923)
260 U. S. 568,583; Justice Brandeis concurred. Likewise, in the National
Motor Bearing case, Circuit Judge Haney dissented on the basis that "un-
less we insist upon precise findings there is danger that the Board may
carelessly leave a progressively largeii number of facts to be ascertained
by inference." N. L. R. B. v. Nat'l Motor Bearing Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 652, 665. And, in the International Shoe case, Justice Stone
dissented, in an opinion concurred in by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, on
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VI. A GLANCE AT JUDICIAL FINDINGS OF FACT
The demand for ultimate and supporting findings of fact by
administrative agencies finds a rough parallel in the large body
of state legislation requiring trial courts to make general and
special findings of fact. °0  It is therefore interesting to observe
that critical appraisals of these two types of judicial findings
coincide somewhat with what can be said concerning their re-
spective administrative counterparts. Thus, for example, Sunder-
land says of general findings of fact by a court-as we have said
of administrative findings of ultimate fact-that they "are purely
formal requirements, which serve no substantially useful purpose
and ought always to follow as a necessary inference from the
judgment itself."'' 0 1 His further comment, however, that "they
cause little or no trouble because they are easy to draw and can
be supplied by intendment whenever the point is raised, 10
2
represents, as we have seen, the ideal rather than the actual
situation with respect to judicial review of administrative find-
ings. As for special findings, Sunderland considers their only
utility to be the facilitation of appellate review by clarifying the
issues for the reviewing tribunal ;-3 after the issues have been
presented in turn by the pleadings, the evidence, and the briefs
and arguments of counsel, special findings can hardly be said to
add much to the information of the parties and of the trial court,
the ground that the Commission's findings should have been sustained be-
cause supported by the evidence; he does not specifically attack the doctrine.
100. According to Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact (1937)
4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 206-207, in some 19 jurisdictions the court in jury-
waived and equity cases must make special findings of fact in writing, and
in an additional 20 the court must make such findings when requested by
the parties. This requirement had its genesis as an attempt to impose uporz
non-jury trials a procedure comparable to the "special verdict" in trials by
jury at common law. See Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in Cases Where Juries are Waived (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 218, 221.
101. Sunderland, supra note 100, at 225. Compare the discussion of ad-
ministrative findings of ultimate fact at pp. 64, 68 et seq., 72-73, Part One,
supra.
See, for some cases urging that special findings aid in acquainting the
parties with what was really adjudicated, Judge Nordbye, Improvements in
Statement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (1940) 1 F. R. D.
25, 26, 27.
102. Thus, for example, courts will, in the absence of an affirmative
showing to the contrary, presume a waiver of general findings even where
no waiver has in fact taken place, Sunderland, supra note 100, at 225.
103. He definitely repudiates the notion that findings have much value in
determining whether the facts found are sufficient in law to support the
judgment. Id. at 230.
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
or to be necessary as a matter of ordinary trial practice.Y04
From this conclusion, Sunderland draws the corollary that the
preparation of special findings should be deferred until an appeal
is entered, but it is questionable to what extent the courts agree
with his view. 0 5 Since administrative proceedings have in effect
assimilated all the judicial trappings-pleadings, the formal tak-
ing of evidence, briefs and oral argument-it would seem to
follow that the proper emphasis to place on supporting findings
of fact (the administrative counterpart of special findings) is
that they may be a most effective, but are certainly not an indis-
pensable, method of presenting to an appellate tribunal the fac-
tual issues involved in the administrative proceeding.
It may be desirable in this connection to take a brief glance at
the experience of the federal courts with the theory of special
findings. Rule 52 (a) of the new Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires of trial courts in non-jury actions that they "find the facts
specially" and that these findings are not to be set aside by a
reviewing court unless "clearly erroneous."'*6 The rule has never
been defended as a means of giving notice to the affected parties;
it exists exclusively for the purpose of facilitating judicial re-
view0 T and was originally conceived as a means of conserving
judicial time and eliminating litigious delay and expense. It was
hoped, by narrowing and crystallizing the controverted questions
of fact in a judicial trial, to shorten appellate records and reduce
the amount of evidence which would have to be passed on by the
104. See Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1920) 235 Mass. 482, 494,
126 N. E. 841, 843; Sunderland, supra note 100, at 228, 230. The cases,
however, sustain every type of objection to a special finding that could have
been made to a special verdict. Sunderland, supra note 100, at 227.
105. Under Rule 52 (a), discussed in note 106, infra, it has been held that
findings of fact may be filed or amended after judgment has been entered,
Reinstine v. Rosenfield (C. C. A. 7, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 892.
106. Rule 52(a) extends the scope of Equity Rule 701/2, which had
governed equity actions only, so as to make it applicable to all non-jury
actions. Stonega Coke and Coal Co. v. Price (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 106 F. (2d)
411, cert. den. (1939) 308 U. S. 618; Guilford Const. Co. v. Biggs (C. C. A.
4, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 46; Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice As
Affected By the New Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
It also calls for separately stated conclusions of law.
It should be borne in mind, in generalizing from the experience of the
courts under these two rules, that the parent rule itself is of recent vintage,
having been effective only since October 1, 1930. See Lane, Twenty Years
Under the Federal Equity Rules (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 644.
107. See United States v. Institute of Carpet Manufacturers of America,
Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 1 F. R. D. 636.
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reviewing tribunal, 8 And in situations where the parties are
willing to stipulate the facts,10 9 or do not object to the facts as
found by the court, or where it takes only a cursory inspection of
the record to establish that the findings made by the lower court
were not "clearly erroneous," 110 the rule serves to remove certain
evidential areas from controversy and hence from the necessity
of re-examination by an appellate court. However, it was pointed
out prior to the adoption of Equity Rule 70 , and is still true,
that findings of fact will not helpfully reduce the record up for
review "if a controverted finding was based on all the evidence
in the case, or if a finding was objected to as being unsupported
by any evidence.""' It is apparent that this latter state of af-
fairs still exists, with painful frequency, in many important
cases where administrative action is being reviewed.
Rule 52 (a) has, on the whole, received a flexible and sympa-
thetic construction at the hands of the courts that contrasts nota-
bly with the rigid application of fact-finding dogma in the case
of administrative agencies. The courts, reluctant to base their
decisions on procedural informalities, have explored the record
even when findings have not been made by the lower court n2
and have recognized that the lower court is "something more
108. See Griswold and Mitchell, Narrative Record in Federal Equity
Appeals (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 513-514; Clark and Stone, supra note
100, at 205, and at 209, note 73. Special findings do have the effect of
shortening the record in the case of appeals from the court of claims, for
the rules governing such appeals provide that the record on review contain
only the findings and no evidence; review is limited to questions of law,
Union Pacific Ry. v. U. S. (1885) 116 U. S. 154; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v.
U. S. (1926) 272 U. S. 533, 538.
Findings, by abbreviating the record, reduce the cost to the appellant
of printing the record on appeal. See Vennell v. U. S., (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1941) 36 F. Supp. 646.
109. Paine v. Welsh (D. C. D. Mass. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 341; State Street
Trust Co. v. White (D. C. D. Mass. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 122; Bradlee v.
White (D. C. D. Mass. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 569; United States v. Institute
of Carpet Manufacturers of America (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 1 F. R. D.
636. But cf. Nordbye, supra note 101, at 31.
110. In other words, where the court does not have to review the evidence
de novo. Webb v. Frisch (C. C. A. 7, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 887.
A frequent advantage of the findings of fact apparatus, for example, is
that it enables a court to isolate factual determinations in respect of which
the credibility of witnesses is a significant factor, and the facts as found
by the lower court consequently entitled to even greater than ordinary
acceptance. See the cases cited in the Annotation to Rule 52(a) in 28
U. S. C. A. 108; Clark and Stone, supra note 100, at 207-208.
111. Griswold and Mitchell, supra note 108, at 514.
112. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co.
(C. C. A. 6, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 764.
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than a 'whistling post' on the highway of an ultimate destina-
tion."1 1 3 Even though the rule might have been construed to
require a formal segregation of findings of fact from the court's
opinion,"13 appellate courts generally have accepted fact findings
as complying with the rule even when they constituted part of
of the body of the opinion," 5 or amounted simply to a confirma-
tion of a master's report."6 Formal findings by a court have been
held unnecessary where all statements of fact made by plaintiffs
or defendants are admitted in documents on file in the proceed-
ing." 7 In fact, it has been said that the effect of the rule is to
make the writing of a considered opinion on the facts super-
erogatory ;U8 formal findings and opinion are merely alternative
methods of apprising an appellate court of the relevant material
facts. The courts have furthermore said that precise findings on
material issues were not essential where the reviewing tribunal
was able to understand the basis for the determination reached
below 19
As might be expected, several difficulties of definition seem to
inhere in the requirement that the special findings of the trial
court be of "material," "essential," or "ultimate" facts. 20 In the
113. Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.(D. C. W. D. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 15.
114. And ,is so construed by Judge Nordbye, see supra note 101, at 28,
who takes a much more restrictive approach to the entire rule.
115. Ilsen, supra note 106. Jackson County v. Alton Rail Co. (C. C. A.
8, 1939), 105 F. (2d) 633, cert. den. 60 S. Ct. 175; Foster v. U. S. (D. C. D.
Mass. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 837; Proctor v. White (D. C. D. Mass. 1939) 28 F.
Supp. 161.
116. Green Valley Creamery, Inc. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1, 1939) 108 F. (2d)
342.
117. United States Trust Co. v. Sears (D. C. D. Conn. 1939) 29 F.
Supp. 643.
118. Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp.
41; Penmac Corp. v. Esterbrook Steel Pen Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 86; Scoville Mfg. Co. v. U. S. Electric Mfg. Corp. (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 115. Judge Otis points out, however, that an
opinion is still useful in clarifying the trial judge's own mental processes,
Otis, Improvements in Statement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (1940) 1 F. R. D. 83, 87.
119. Ilsen and Hone, supra note 106; Goodacre v. Panagopoulos (App.
D. C. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 716 (Associate Justice Stephens dissenting); cf.
Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v. Mains (C. C. A. 10, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 377. But
cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U. S. (1938) 304 U. S. 55; Mayo v. Lakeland
Highlands Canning Co., Inc. (1940) 309 U. S. 310; City of Sumter v. Spur
Distributing Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 649.
120. Ilsen and Hone, supra note 106; Penmac Corp. v. Esterbrook Steel
Pen Mfg. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 86 ("essential");
Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (D. C. W.
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first place, are "material" facts the same as "ultimate" facts? If
they are, can there be any doubt as to what those facts are once
one has read the language of the statute, and why republish
them?1 21" Furthermore, here as elsewhere, will not special find-
ings be difficult to distinguish from conclusions of law on the one
hand,122 and from mere evidence on the other? 123 And finally, if
findings need only be of facts material to the decision, does it
not become impermissible to reverse a tribunal, solely on the
basis that a single finding in support of the decision was errone-
ous, when other fact findings would independently have sup-
ported the findings of ultimate fact required by the statute?' 2'
VII. FURTHER PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
Although most of the cases which require supporting findings
of fact seem to do so primarily on the basis of judicial irritation
at having to review a defective administrative record, the argu-
ment is occasionally noted that fact findings are necessary in
order to apprise an adversely affected party of facts which may
guide his future course of action.12- How significant is this con-
sideration? Bearing in mind the continuous and flexible nature
of administrative proceedings and the continuing status of many
parties (particularly public utilities) of subjection to the admin-
istrative process, party and agency alike may be said to obtain,
by mere participation in the administrative proceeding, a type of
"direct," "actual" or "express" notice'12 6 that is probably less
misleading than would be given by findings of fact; findings of
D. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 15 ("material"); McGee v. Nee (C. C. A. 8, 1940)
113 F. (2d) 543 ("ultimate").
121. See pp. 64, 67, 70, 72-73, Part One, supra.
122. See Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact" (1937) 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 233, 242 et seq.; Clark and Stone, supra note 100, at 211, note 93;
Otis, supra note 104, at 85; United States v. Anderson (C. C. A. 7, 1939)
108 F. (2d) 475, 479, cert. den. (1940) 309 U. S. 688; Circuit Judge
Magruder concurring in Manning v. Gagne (C. C. A. 1, 1939) 108 F. (2d)
718, at 721.
123. See Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. U. S. (1926) 272 U. S. 533, 541; McGee
v. Nee (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 543, 546.
124. Cf. the Stephens approach, pp. 176 et seq. supra.
125. See Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1937)
94 F. (2d) 623, 625. The concern of the Morgan and Opp cases with what
constitutes a "full hearing" to the parties affected seems to mirror the
same consideration.
126. See Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice (1936) 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417,
418.
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fact are, after all, truncated summaries of the evidence, and
hence necessarily distort the evidence.227 Or, if one cavils at
saying that affected parties acquire direct notice, do they not get
a kind of "implied notice," i. e., the notice of facts which may be
inferred from facts of which they are directly conscious, that
should be equally satisfactory ?128 After all, findings of fact,
whether subsidiary or ultimate, are no more than crystalliza-
tions of, and inferences from, evidentiary facts already put in
the record. In the same way that the presence of supporting
findings of fact implies the existence of the ultimate finding
required by the-statute,1 2 9 the finding of an ultimate fact implies
that the necessary supporting findings have been made;"' surely
one can assume that the relationship between evidence that has
been taken and the individual facts that have to be found is also
mutually implicative. What real likelihood is there that parties
who have been through the turmoil of the administrative process,
have been given full opportunity to tender evidence, cross-
examine and rebut the evidence offered by the administrative
agency, file and answer briefs, etc., are unaware of the bases of
administrative action? 131
127. It may be noted that one of the objections to the narrative record,
which condenses evidence much less than findings do, is that it does not
convey a true picture of the proceedings at the trial, see Griswold and
Mitchell, supra note 108, at 504; Lane, Federal Equity Rules, (1922) 35
Harv. L. Rev. 276, 299.
128. "One who does not know a fact affecting his legal position may
nevertheless be conscious of other facts so strongly indicating the existence
of the ultimate fact that a man of ordinary prudence would inquire con-
cerning it or conduct his business as though it existed." Merrill, supra
note 126, at 419. -~ * * a policy of the law, based on that standard of
reasonable conduct upon which juristic science so frequently leans, forbids
people to lapse into carefree inattention." Id. at 430. Notice, as defined in
the Restatement of Agency, "now enumerates knowledge, reason to know
(inquiry-stimulating facts), duty to know and notification (notice based on
formality)." Id. at 427.
129. N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 652, 658.
130. Manufacturers Ry. v. U. S. (1918) 246 U. S. 457; N. L. R. B. v.
Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905, 912.
131. Cf. Lenihan v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Minn. 1940)
293 N. W. 601.
A different situation is presented when it is not known whether the
finding made by the administrative body is exclusive, and evidence has been
presented on which no specific findings have been made. Thus, in A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C. C. A. 7, 1941) 120 F. (2d)
258, the Secretary of Agriculture had found that refined sugar (sucrose)
and refined corn sugar (dextrose) were saccharine ingredients in sweetened
condensed milk, but did not find that they were the only/ ingredients. Peti-
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Particularly in a situation where lengthy records and difficult
problems are involved, an administrative agency, for reasons of
internal self-discipline if for no other reason, should not rely
unduly on the ability of affected parties or of the courts to draw
inferences which are implicit in the evidence; it should give such
inferences explicit statement. " However, as has been seen,
formal findings of fact are not the only device whereby such
explicit statement can be achieved. Moreover, such statement
should not be a strait-jacket for the administrative process but
tioner, who manufactured corn syrup (glucose) was therefore unable to
ascertain whether his product had been found to be a saccharine ingredient,
and it was impossible to tell from the record whether the Secretary of Agri-
culture had weighed the evidence and cast it aside in the exercise of his
discretion. The case was therefore remanded, so that the Secretary could
either make a specific finding with reference to corn syrup, or an exclusive
finding with respect to refined sugar and corn sugar.
The requirement of the Staley case for specificity and comprehensiveness
in the making of findings is frequently impracticable. Thus, for example, in
Andree & Seedman, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div. (App.
D. C. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 634, the Administrator was required by statute
to adopt the highest minimum wage which, "having due regard to economic
and competitive conditions, will not substantially curtail employment in the
industry." The court decided that, even though the competition of home
production was a relevant factor, a finding on that point was not neces-
sary: "* * * probably an almost innumerable list of items relevant to
economic and competitive conditions can be compiled. But the statute does
not * * * require a finding on each of these supposititious factors" (p. 637).
131a. In valuation cases, for example, it has been said that the right of
appeal may prove valueless to appellants unless findings of fact are made,
see Northern States Power Co. v. Bd. of Railroad Comm. (N. Dak. 1941)
298 N. W. 423 (State Commission required to make separate findings con-
cerning going concern value of utility, and allowances for increased costs
of operation).
Considering their complexity, one can say the same of reorganizations.
Cf., for example, In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. R. Co.
(C. C. A. 7, decided December 4, 1941) where the reorganization plan ap-
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission was held to have support
in the evidence and to violate none of the legal requirements set forth in
the applicable case precedents, save findings. The case was therefore re-
manded for the making of findings on all "vital issues, controverted and
uncontroverted," findings "so specific that the court may definitely see that
in the new plan, provision for full compensation of cancelled old senior
securities, and all prior preferred positions, is made." (The findings had to
include the values of the properties, both separately and in the aggregate,
the liens to be surrendered, and the securities to be given in exchange, and
to show that fixed interest charges were included and that values were
based on income-producing factors.) It is difficult to see how a court which,
like this one, had a realistic perception of the bargaining elements inherent
in reorganization plans, elements that make it impossible to obtain clear-cut
values, could have entertained the illusion that specific findings of values
would support specific amounts of compensation under the reorganization
plan. Cf. also In re Western Pacific R. IL Co. (C. C. A. 9, decided Novem-
ber 28, 1941).
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rather a clarifying adjunct. The rigid ritual with which some
courts, including the Supreme Court, have surrounded findings
of fact reached at the conclusion of an administrative proceeding
is in marked contrast to the pragmatic approach of the Supreme
Court with respect to the tentative findings of fact proposed by
an agency at the initiation or during the course of a proceeding.
Yet, if notice be the guiding consideration behind both types of
finding, would it not follow that fact findings in the former case
should be as flexible and dispensable as in the latter? In the
second Morgan case, for example, tentative findings by the Gov-
ernment were acknowledged to be only one of five alternative
methods of giving an adversary a reasonable opportunity to know
the Government's claims.132 Likewise, in National Labor Relations
Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., the Court decided
that, although the Board had failed to find in so many words that
there was a current labor dispute, nevertheless there was no mis-
understanding in actual fact as to what was the basis of the
Board's complaint 3 3 Furthermore, although the main purpose
of a pleading under the modern procedure practice is the giving
of notice to the other parties to the proceeding,'34 generality of
allegation is the favored trend in the drafting of pleadings, 35
and it has been said that only resultant ultimate facts should be
pleaded 36 If this trend, and the recently expressed desideratum
132. (1938) 304 U. S. 1; see Otis, D. J., dissenting in Morgan v. U. S.
(D. C. W. D. Me. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 546.
Another method by which the Government could have given notice in the
Morgan case was to submit a brief setting out its claims. Compare, how-
ever, the statement in Sanders Bros. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1939) 106 F.
(2d) 321, that it was insufficient that facts be marshalled and presented in
the brief on appeal, and that they must be prepared separately as findings
of fact.
133. (1938) 304 U. S. 333. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Phelps-Dodge Corp., dis-
cussed at p. 68 et seq., Part One, supra.
134. Pike, Some Current Trends in the Construction of the Federal Rules(1940) 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 26; 4 Federal Rules Service-Commentary-
8a. 24.
For the proposition that administrative findings should cover the pleaded
facts, see Tesch v. Industrial Comm. (1930) 200 Wis. 616, 229 N. W. 194.
135. Pike, supra note 134, at 30; S. E. C. v. Timetrust, Inc. (D. C. N. D.
Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 34; Van Dyke v. Broadhurst (D. C. N. D. Pa. 1939)
28 F. Supp. 737; MacLeod v. Cohen-Erichs Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939)
28 F. Supp. 103; Young v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1940) 32 F.
Supp. 389. Cf. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co. (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 728; Folding Furniture Works v.
Wisconsin Labor Relations Board (Wis. 1939) 285 N. W. 851.
136. Maylender v. Fulton County Gas and Electric Co. (1928) 131 Misc.
514, 227 N. Y. S. 209; Mining Securities Co. v. Wall (1935) 99 Mont. 596,
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that the law will abandon the distinction between "evidentiary
facts" and "ultimate facts"'31 gain currency in the administrative
field, the courts may cease to give subsidiary or supporting find-
ings of fact the determinative role which they at present enjoy
and view them only as convenient adjuncts to judicial appraisal
of the evidence before the administrative body.
However, the conclusion that administrative bodies have meth-
ods of notice-giving to parties alternative and possibly superior
to the machinery of "findings of fact" does not absolve these
agencies from the obligation, so long as a system of judicial
review prevails, of giving the courts some notion of the basis of
their action. From this standpoint, Judge Stephens' analysis
may be useful, provided one recognizes findings of fact as being
in reality propositions about facts 18 and also recognizes the in-
creasing extent to which judicial and administrative proof has
become speculative and deductive in nature.139 We are still in-
fluenced, perhaps unduly, by the prestige of the Brandeis brief,
which was primarily an exercise in induction 40 and the pre-
dominant motif of which was the presentation of factual gen-
eralizations, derived from observation and investigation, to serve
as a constitutional basis for a statute; thus, for example, statis-
tics of economic degradation and ill-health would be cumulated
in order to convince the courts of the propriety, under the due
process clause, of minimum wage, maximum hour and tenement
dwelling legislation. We are living, however, in an era when this
type of approach is of diminishing significance.
Statistical procedures still have their place, but they are now
primarily for the legislature when it wrestles with issues of
constitutionality and broad policy. Administrative agencies, on
45 P. (2d) 302. The difficulty, of course, lies in distinguishing "ultimate"
facts from "evidence." Cf. note 123, supra.
137. See Hughes and Kaftan, Wisconsin Code Compared with the New
Federal Rules of Procedure (1938) Wis. L. Rev. 517, 521.
138. I. e., administrators and judges never find facts, but only state
propositions about facts. See Michael and Adler, The Trial of an Issue of
Fact (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1224, 1249, 1259, 1268.
139. See Michael and Adler, supra note 138, at 1278. The generally held,
but fallacious view is that all judicial proof is inductive in nature. See, e. g.,
Wigmore, The Science of Judicial P'oof (3rd ed. 1937) 22. Wigmore makes
the strange concession that reasoning concerning the credibility of witnesses
may, however, be put into deductive form, id. at 315.
140. Peirce defines induction very simply as "where we generalize from
a number of cases of which something is true, and infer that the same
thing is true of a whole class." See Chance, Love, and Logic (1923) 135.
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the other hand, must continuously grapple with economic and
engineering problems where fresh paths must be broken, and
statistics are either non-existent, irrelevant, or misleading.
Formerly, the biography, statistical or otherwise, .of an evil
supplied the clue for its amelioration, which was largely the
process of setting in motion a negative trend. Our concern now
is with the capacity of expert administrative bodies possessing
insight, a knowledge of economic theory, and an aptitude for
speculative thinking, correctly to interpret the basic legislative
mandates, and to apply those mandates to more or less unprec-
edented fact situations and unanticipated evils. One indication
of this trend is the current revival of interest in the doctrine
of the "equity of a statute," i. e., the notion that the basic pur-
pose of a statute may be applied to situations not expressly
set forth in the statute.14 1 When administrative agencies are
confronted with problems such as oil, milk, security and water-
shed regulation, it is delusive for them to clothe assumptions
which must of necessity be speculative in the guise of formal
findings of fact.142 Facts no longer are required to be found
inductively; rather propositions of fact have to be arrived at
deductively. 4 3
To the extent that what has just been said is a true picture
of the contemporary administrative regulative field, the follow-
ing by an agency of some articulate deductive pattern in render-
ing its factual conclusions seems desirable. To convert any
specific logical pattern into mandatory procedure, as Judge
141. In the field of action, see United States v. Hutcheson (1941) 61 S. Ct.
463, 467; Johnson v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1908) 163 Fed. 30, 32; and
the general policy of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
with respect to labor unions. For theoretical discussions of the concept, see
De Sloovre, The Equity and Reason of a Statute (1936) 21 Cornell L. Q.
591; Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law (1934) Harvard Legal Essays
213, 216, 235; Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of
Their Policy by the English Courts (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 519; Thorne,
The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case (1936) 31 Il. L. Rev. 202.
142. See Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co.
(1941) 311 U. S. 570; Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. (1941) 313 U. S.
508.
143. Since the significant and currently embarrassing problems of ad-
ministrative regulation lie in the economic field, the words of an eminent
economist, Karl Biicher, quoted in Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature
(1931) 373, are particularly apposite: "The only method of investigation
which will enable us to approach the complex causes of commercial phe-
nomena is that of abstract isolation and logical deduction. The sole inductive
process that can likewise be considered, namely, the statistical, is not suffi-
ciently exact and penetrating."
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Stephens has done, is, however, to ignore several factors. For
one thing, logical patterns are not necessarily descriptions of
the way in which tribunals have arrived at their conclusions,
i. e., of their investigative processes, but purely a method of de-
termining the correctness or incorrectness of the conclusions that
they have reached, i. e., of their processes of proof.144 The re-
sponsibility for seeing to it that the administrative agency
reaches correct conclusions should be regarded as a cooperative
enterprise, and the administrative agency as the moving partner;
the courts, therefore, do not discharge their responsibility by
stipulating that the administrative agency, at the risk of reversal
(i. e., the partial undoing of already accomplished partnership
business) follow a logical pattern arbitrarily prescribed by
them.14 5 A large part of what underlies administrative decision
is experience acquired in the course of similar investigations
and hearings (and hence uniquely the property of the agency) ;
even as the specific hearing in question progresses, the agency
may become aware of new matters through extra-logical
means. 46 Nor is it anti-rationalistic to point out that, while
knowledge, once attained, may be cast into a discursive and com-
municable pattern, it originates largely in intuition. 47 Intuition,
144. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 143, at 50.
145. Thus, for example, although the Wisconsin courts have repeatedly
urged the importance and necessity of specific administrative findings, they
have held that their absence is not necessarily reversible error. See Buhlek
v. Dept. of Agri. and Markets. (Wis. 1938) 280 N. W. 367, 370, and cases
there cited. Cf., however, Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt
(C. C. A. 8, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 396, 398, conceding that a finding was a
formal recitation "not necessary, as a matter of statutory prescription, to
give validity to the promulgating order; that it is simply a judicial require-
ment, imposed as a convenience in a review proceeding, to aid in satisfying
legal conscience and in lightening judicial responsibility," but approving
reversal of the Administrator for failure to make such a finding.
146. As Aristotle has said, it would be strange indeed if one were to
know a thing in the precise manner in which one is learning it. Posterior
Analytics, Bk. 1, c. 1.
147. As Aristotle puts it, the "intuitive reason" apprehends both the
universally axiomatic truths which deductive reasoning presupposes, and
the particular facts of life which form the materials of induction. Nico-
machean Ethics, Bk. 6, c. 6, 12. Intuition and induction apprehend the
primary premises from which scientific knowledge springs. Postelior
Analytics, Bk. 2, c. 19.
One must beware, of course, of using intuition as a substitute for dis-
cursive logical patterns when the latter are available. Cf. the statement
of the Court in Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. Babcock (1907) 204 U. S. 585,
598, that many administrative judgments "express an intuition of experi-
ence which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled im-
pressions, impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing
their worth."
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experience and judgment are at a premium when dealing with,
for example, such problems as whether control is being exercised
over a corporate enterprise,1 8 or stock trading is engaged in for
the purpose of raising stock prices, 49 or a railroad has "domi-
nated" municipal action,150 or how consumers will react to a
specific labelling of a commodity's inferiority, 1;' or when a rail-
road is a "producer" of coal.' 5 2
Particular scope must be given "potent imponderables" in pass-
ing on such administrative determinations as a Labor Board deci-
sion that an employer has interfered with the collective bargain-
ing process.5 3 Since this power of intuition and judgment is a
function of experience, and a judge does not have the same oppor-
tunity for the accumulation of experience in a specific field as an
148. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. U. S. (1939) 307 U. S. 125; Detroit
Edison Co. v. S. E. C. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 730.
149. In the Matter of Harold T. White (1938) 3 S. E. C. 466, 509, where
the Commission said:
"Judgment as to what were the purposes for which transactions were
effected in the past is a human undertaking involving inescapable subjective
factors in the minds of those who pass judgment and is therefore not safe-
guarded against error. Accordingly, as best we can, we must 'balance' one
factor in the record against another with adequate humility and awareness
that we may err in a matter gravely affecting the lives of other human
beings."
Commissioner Healy, relying on a different experiential reaction to the
partnership relation but on no materially different findings of fact, dissented
from the decision of the Commission's majority that the partner of a person
found guilty of raising security prices was not himself guilty of the same
offense.
150. Union Pacific R. R. v. U. S. (1941) 313 U. S. 450 (holding the
Elkins Act prohibition of rebates in connection with transportation appli-
cable in a situation where a city had made various adjustments in rental,
paid moving expenses, etc., in order to encourage shippers to relocate their
business at a new terminal). Mr. Justice Roberts dissented, in an opinion
concurred in by Justices Black and Douglas, on the ground that the Elkins
Act was never intended to reach others than carriers.
151. See Fuchs, The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 Law and Contem. Prob. 43, 55.
152. Gray v. Powell (1941) 62 S. Ct. 326.
153. "Known hostility to one union and clear discrimination against it
may indeed make seemingly trivial intimations of preference for another
union powerful assistance for it. Slight suggestions as to the employer's
choice between unions may have telling effect among men who know the
consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure." In such a
situation "technical concepts pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility
to third persons for acts of his servants" must yield to "a clear legislative
policy to free the collective bargaining process from all taint of an em-
ployer's compulsion, domination, or influence." International Ass'n of
Machinists v. N. L. R. B. (1940) 311 U. S. 72, 78. Accord: Consumer's
Power Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 38, 44; N. L. R. B.
v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905, 911. Contra: Conn
v. N. L. B. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390.
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administrative agency exclusively dedicated to work in that field,
insistence on a mode of expression that may not recapture these
impalpable determinants is unwise. Language being the uncer-
tain medium of expression that it is, different people may mean
the same thing although they use different words. 54 Further-
more, insistence on the faithful following of a set phraseology
may serve purposes entirely unrelated to observance of the man-
date of the statute. 5
The superior expertness of administrative agencies has been
urged as ground for relaxing the conditions under which they
reach their results, i. e., for permitting them to take official notice
of facts not specifically introduced into the record, 5 to rely on
hearsay evidence,157 and otherwise to depart from technical com-
154. Thus, for example, in N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power
Co. (United States Sup. Ct., decided December 22, 1941) the Supreme Court
was evidently of the view that the Board had found that certain utter-
ances by officers of the employer company, standing alone, amounted to
coercion of its employees and interferences with their right to organize.
The Circuit Court, however, was apparently of the belief that the utterances
had been considered in the context of surrounding circumstances, see (C. C.
A. 4, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 414, 420, 421, and the language used by the Board
could, in the author's opinion, have been thus interpreted. It was clear from
the Board's decision that the prior background and circumstances surround-
ing the employer's utterances had in fact been taken into account by the
Board, even if not formally recapitulated with precise accuracy in the ulti-
mate findings of the Board. The case was nevertheless remanded so that
the Board might have the opportunity of issuing an explicit finding that
these utterances, in the context of surrounding circumsntances, amounted to
coercion and interference with employee bargaining.
155. The result reached in the Virginia Electric case, discussed in note
154, supra, may have been due to unwillingness on the part of the Court to
decide whether the employer's utterances, standing alone, constituted
coercion and interferences with union organization. The case is difficult to
understand, for it seems self-evident that, since the Board had found that
the utterances, standing alone, constituted coercion and interference, it
would be even more likely to find that the same utterances, in the context
of the prior labor history of the employer and other surrounding circum-
stances, constituted coercion. It would seem that the Court in this case
disregarded the sound admonitions quoted from the International Associa-
tion of Machinists case, in note 153, supra, and is pursuing the path of
captiousness initiated by the Phelps-Dodge case, see p. 68, Part One, supra,
but this may be attributable to a desire on the Court's part to bypass the
constitutional free speech issue raised by the employer.
156. See Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings (1941) 84 et seq.
157. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1938) 305 U. S. 197,
229; International Ass'n of Machinists v. N. L. R. B. (1940) 311 U. S. 75;
Cudahy Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 116 F. (2d)
867, 375; Administrative Procedure Hearings, 498.
Wigmore points out that "all Commerce and Industry are based on hear-
say assertions, intermediate or ultimate," Wigmore, The Science of Judicial
Proof (3rd ed. 1937) 723; cf. Smith v. Olson (1926) 50 S. Dak. 81, 208
N. W. 585. The increasing preoccupation of administration with the regula-
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mon law rules of relevancy and competency in the consideration
of evidence. 8 Why not a like measure of tolerance for them
when they recapitulate the results which they have reached in
the form of fact findings?
The vice of nullifying an administrative order because of in-
dividual incorrect findings without taking a view of the evidence
as a whole should be apparent regardless of whether the evidence
relied on is of the testimonial or circumstantial variety. Assum-
ing that testimonial evidence is involved, such evidence is gen-
erally cumulative in nature; anybody studying the text of court
opinions reviewing the actions of the National Labor Relations
Board, for example, will be struck by the extent to which specific
items of testimony are set forth in extenso as leading severally
to the ultimate statutory finding of interference with union or-
ganization, or discriminatory discharge, without being sum-
marized or subsumed under any more general, but still sub-
sidiary, finding. If the proof relied on is circumstantial (and a
large measure of the difficulty with judicial treatment of ad-
ministrative proof lies in the failure to recognize the decreasing
importance of testimonial proof in many administrative mat-
ters) 15 9 alternative chains of reasoning leading to the same result
tion of industry and commerce is therefore a further argument for adminis-
trative reliance on hearsay. If hearsay is admissible on questions of family
relationship and marriage, see McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay
(1936) 39 Yale L. J. 489, 496, why not also for the economic relationships
and "business marriages" that are such vital matters of governmental
regulatory concern and so difficult of proof?
158. See Stephan, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be
Bound by Rules of Evidence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 630, 635, 636.
159. This declining importance is evidenced by the tendency on the part
of some courts not to insist on cross-examination and other guarantees for
the veracity of testimonial proof. California Lumbermen's Council v. F. T.
C. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 115 F. )(2d) 178, 184; cf. cases cited in note 157,
supra. Contra (and to the author's mind wrongly decided) Powhatan Min-
ing Co. v. Ickes (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 105.
'The declining significance of cross-examination in rate- or price-fixing
cases, for example, becomes apparent when one considers the factors which
cross-examination was designed to elicit, i. e., "the opportunity which the
witness had of ascertaining the fact to which he testifies, his ability to
acquire the requisite knowledge, his powers of memory, his situation with
respect to the parties, his motives." 1 Starkie, Evidence (Gerhard's 7 Am.
ed. 1842) 23. Obviously an expert's ability to ascertain facts is dependent
upon the character of his research and the nature of his sources; his
ability to acquire the requisite knowledge is a function of his academic
training and prior experience; his powers of memory are replaced by "the
cold figures found in the reports, showing the volume of business, cost of
operation, and earnings, [which] tell the same story to all," see In re Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 7, decided Decem-
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are possible. 60 The mere fact that one of the cumulative or
alternative lines of reasoning has proven, upon judicial scrutiny,
to be defective, affords no reason that the chains of reasoning
which remain unimpugned cannot carry the administrative
agency safely over from the evidence before it to the factual
determinations which the statute requires it to reach.
One may add to these various logical considerations an im-
pelling substantive argument. The processes of logical articula-
tion such as are involved in the machinery of fact findings, while
valuable intellectual discipline for the agency, consume consider-
able time, particularly when the administrative agency knows, as
it frequently does, that its findings will not be viewed in a broad
and understanding light, but will be dissected and scrutinized as
occasions for litigation by captiously-minded adversaries.' 16 The
courts should therefore not reverse an administrative body on
the basis of failure to set forth ultimate or subsidiary findings
of fact, unless the administrative determination does not meet
some statutoriy prescribed formula with respect to the evidence
itself,162 or is an excursion into the realm of non-existent fact or
arbitrary inference. If the use of such concepts as subsidiary
and ultimate findings aids in that type of judicial operation,
little harm is done by using them, but danger lies in taking
verbal formulae as reality rather than as guides to reality.
ber 4, 1941) ; and his motives and situation with respect to the parties are
clear, once it becomes apparent for which side he is testifying. What more
can cross-examination elicit?
Even the otherwise shrewd dissenting opinion of Otis, D. J., in Morgan v.
U. S. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1940).32 F. Supp. 546, 557, over-emphasizes the
importance of testimonial evidence.
160. See Michael and Adler, supra note 138, at 1298.
161. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards v.
U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 93; Administrative Procedure Hearings, 478.
162. Failure to apprehend the logical nature of so-called "findings of
fact" may well becloud the operation of the rules governing judicial review
of the evidence taken by the administrative body. For example, the fear
of one of the proponents of the "substantial evidence" rule that the rule,
although applied to underlying facts, will not be applied to the inferences
drawn from them to the ultimate facts (see Stason, "Substantial Evidence"
in Administrative Law (1941) 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026, 1051) becomes
largely groundless once the inferential nature of the "fact-finding" is prop-
erly appreciated.
For a case which says that Rule 52 (a) does not intrench inferences from
the findings with the same finality as the findings themselves, see Kuhn v.
Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 704.
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